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Champion: The Second Circuit Takes a Second Look at the Non-Statutory Labor

THE SECOND CIRCUIT TAKES A SECOND
LOOK AT THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR
EXEMPTION IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: A
REVIEW OF WOOD V. NATIONAL BASKETBALL
ASSOCIATION, CALD WELL V. AMERICAN
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION V. WILLIAMS, AND
CLARETT V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
Walter T. Champion, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE CLARETT IMBROGLIO

Maurice Clarett was the star tailback in Ohio State University's
undefeated 2002 football season.' He was the first Ohio State freshman
in sixty years to open the season as the starting running back, and he led
his team to a national championship scoring the winning touchdown in
the 2003 Fiesta Bowl over the University of Miami in double-overtime,
2
32 to 24. From there, he went downhill. Ohio State and the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") suspended him for the 20032004 season.3 Additionally, it appeared that the NCAA would not
permit him to play in the 2004-2005 season.4 In short, he was forced to

Walter Champion is the George Foreman Professor of Sports and Entertainment Law
at the
Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University. He is the author of Sports Law in a
Nutshell, Fundamentals of Sports Law, and Sports Law: Cases, Documents, and Materials. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of reference librarians, Gwen Henderson and Maxine
Asmah, and his research assistant, Elverine "Rena" Jenkins.
1. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 1), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
2. Clarett 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88 ("As a result of his freshman year resounding
success, Clarett was named the Big Ten Freshman of the Year and voted the best running back in
college football by The Sporting News."); see also Joe Drape, Extra! Extra! It's Ohio State, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, at D1.
3. Clarett 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
4. Id.
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sit out what would have been his second year out of high school.5 He
sought to be included in the pool of players eligible for the 2004
National Football League ("NFL") draft to be held on April 24-25,
2004.6
Clarett was unable to enter that draft class because of a rule located
in the NFL's Constitution and Bylaws entitled "Special Eligibility,"
which allowed only those athletes who were three years out of high
school to be eligible. Maurice Clarett graduated from high school in
December 2001, and under the NFL's eligibility rules, was not able to
participate in the college draft until the spring of 2005.8
Judge Scheindlin of the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
on February 5, 2004. 9 Judge Scheindlin also denied the NFL's motion to
stay pending appeal on February 11, 2004.10 However, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Judge Scheindlin's
grant of summary judgment on May 24, 2004."
Judge Scheindlin found for plaintiff on the basis that the NFL's rule
did not fall within the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption and it
was not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 2 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals found that this rule, since it represented a
condition for initial employment, affected the job security of veteran
players and, therefore, had tangible effects on mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining (e.g., wages, hours, and conditions of employment)

5. See id.; see generally William C. Rhoden, Clarett Casts a Shadow over Fallen Ohio State,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, section 8 (discussing that Clarett was suspended after accusations of
"misleading investigators and violating N.C.A.A. bylaws concerning benefits for athletes").
6. See Clarett 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 382; Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett II1), 369
F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).
7. See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385-87; see also Robert D. Koch, 4t5and Goal: Maurice
Clarett Tackles the NFL Eligibility Rule, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 291, 292 (2004).
8. Memorandum in Support of the National Football League's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 4, Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 03-CV7441), 2003 WL23220580.
9. Clarett 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11 (Clarett's motion for summary judgment "should be
granted ... [b]ecause the Rule violates the antitrust laws, it cannot preclude Clarett's eligibility for
the 2004 NFL draft.").
10. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 11), 306 F. Supp. 2d. 411, 414 ("If a stay is
granted, Clarett will miss the 2004 draft. He will not be eligible to play in the NFL until the 2005
draft .... If the stay is granted, Clarett will have effectively lost his lawsuit.").
11. Clarett 1!!, 369 F.3d at 143; Clarett 11, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 412 ("If that Order [granting
summary judgment] is subsequently reversed on appeal, at worst, the NFL will be forced to tolerate
the handful of younger players who are selected in the 2004 draft.").
12. See Clarett 1,306 F. Supp. 2d at 395-96. According to this case, "the Rule makes a class
of potential players unemployable. Wages, hours, or working conditions affect only those who are
employed or eligible for employment." Id. at 393.
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for current NFL players. 13 Furthermore, the fact that the NFL and the

players' union did not bargain over the rule per se was insufficient to
exclude the rule from the exemption since it was included in the NFL's
Constitution and Bylaws. 14 Additionally, the union was aware of the

rule and it generally agreed to waive any challenge to the Constitution
and Bylaws. 15 This essay will formulate the state of the Second Circuit's

"new" formula on the non-statutory labor exemption in professional
sports as exemplified by Clarett v. NationalFootballLeague,1 6 and three
Association,17
older Second Circuit cases: Wood v. National Basketball
18
Association, Inc., and National
Caldwell v. American Basketball
19
Williams.
v.
Association
Basketball

The sad saga of Maurice Clarett continued into 2006. He sat out
two seasons, and was then eligible for the 2005 NFL draft in the normal
course of draft eligibility.

Although slower and less agile, he was

drafted as the last person selected in the third round by the Denver

21
On
Broncos.20 However, eventually he was cut in training camp.
February 22, 2006, he "pleaded not guilty to charges that he flashed a

two people behind a bar on New Year's Day and took a cell
gun at 22
phone."
I. THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION IN PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS BEFORE CLARETT

Clarett's antitrust lawsuit was defeated on the basis of the non-

13. See Clarett I1, 369 F.3d at 139-40. "[B]y reducing competition in the market for entering
players, the eligibility rules also affect the job security of veteran players." Id. at 140.
14. See id. at 142; see also Adam Epstein, The Empire Strikes Back: NFL Cuts Clarett, Sacks
Scheindlin, 22 ENT. & SPORTS L. 12, 17 (2005) (asserting that the "2nd Circuit Court of Appeals
definitely found that the draft eligibility rules are mandatory bargaining subjects ... the eligibility
rules cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest of the complex scheme of salary cap."); see
generally Michael Scheinkman, Comment, Running Out of Bounds: Over-Extending the Labor
Antitrust Exemption in Clarett v. National Football League, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 733 (2005)
(discussing that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals expanded the non-statutory exemption to draft
eligibility even though the provision was only incorporated through reference in the CBA).
369 F.3d at 142.
15. ClarettIII,
16. See id. at 135.
17. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
18. 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
19. 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
20. Joe Drape, Gamble on Clarett Reveals Perils of Potential,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at
D8.
21. See Pete Thamel, Police Seek Clarett's Arrest on Armed Robbery Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 2006, at D1.
22. Clarett Pleads Not Guilty to Robbery Charges, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 22, 2006,
9
3 9
availableat http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2 3 32 .
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statutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws. 23 The Sherman Antitrust
Act2 4 makes illegal every combination in the form of a conspiracy that
restrains interstate commerce.2 5
However, the exemptions to the
26
antitrust laws in sports have all but negated their effectiveness as a
mechanism to protect athletes from management's anti-competitive
27
28
practices. 2
The major exemptions include baseball's exemption,

certain specific NFL exemptions, 29 the statutory labor exemption, 30 and
the non-statutory labor exemption. 31 The purpose of the statutory
exemption is to allow unions to eliminate competition from other unions,
but this privilege cannot be claimed by businesses. 32 The non-statutory
labor exemption emanates from the statutory labor exemption and
protects certain union activities from antitrust scrutiny.3 3 The exemption
was developed by the United States Supreme Court in non-sports

23. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett Ii), 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
24. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
25. Id. § 1; see generally WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., SPORTS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 72 (3d ed.
2005) [hereinafter CHAMPION, NUTSHELL] (stating that antitrust laws have been used to change
player restraint mechanisms in professional sports).
26. See generally CHAMPION, NUTSHELL, supra note 25, at 63-72 (discussing the exemptions
to antitrust laws in sports including the baseball exemption, the labor exemption, the NFL
exemptions, and the non-statutory labor exemption).
27. See WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW 530 (2d ed. 2004)
[hereinafter CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS] (describing that through the development of case law, the
non-statutory labor exemption has been used in professional sports to try to gain antitrust
immunity).
28. See CHAMPION, NUTSHELL, supra note 25, at 63-66; see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258, 285 (1972). This exemption was categorized as "a derelict in the stream of law." Id. at 286
(Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Walter T. Champion Jr., The Baseball Antitrust Exemption
Revisited: 21 Years After Flood v. Kuhn, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 573, 574 (1994).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (providing an "exemption from antitrust laws of agreements
covering the telecasting of sports contests and the combining of professional football leagues"); 15
U.S.C. § 1292 (2006) (providing an exemption for local area telecasting "within the home territory
of a member club of the league on a day when such club is playing a game at home").
30. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22
(1975). The statutory labor exemption originated in provisions of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1227 (2006) and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (2006). See id.; see also CHAMPION,
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 27, at 530.
31. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622-23; see generally CHAMPION, NUTSHELL, supra note 25, at
67-72 (discussing the use of the non-statutory labor exemption in sports).
32. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622-23; CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS, supranote 27, at 530.
33. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 1), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 391 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); see also Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 339, 353 (1989); Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. McKinnon, Professional Football's
Draft Eligibility Rule: The Labor Exemption and the Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 381-82
(1984) ("The [non-statutory] labor exemption attempts to accommodate inherent conflicts between
national labor and antitrust policy and to protect labor-management agreements ... from antitrust
interdiction."); Jonathan S. Shapiro, Note, Warming the Bench: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
in the National Football League, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 1203, 1205 (1993) (noting that the nonstatutory labor exemption protects union practices such as collective bargaining).
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cases. 34 Under this exemption, any union-management agreement that is
a product of good faith negotiation will be protected from the antitrust
laws. 35 This exemption will apply where alleged players' restraint
mechanisms primarily affect only those parties to the collective
bargaining agreement, where the restraint concerns a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining, and where the provision that is sought to be
exempted is a product of bona fide arm's length bargaining.3 6
The preeminent sports non-statutory labor exemption case is
Mackey v. National Football League.37 In Mackey, plaintiffs sued to
determine if the NFL's "Rozelle Rule" violated antitrust laws. 38 This
rule allowed the NFL commissioner, Pete Rozelle, to require the club
acquiring a free agent to compensate the former team with money,
players, and/or draft picks. 39 Although this rule did not deal with a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, it operated to restrict a
player's mobility to move freely from team to team, thus, depressing
salaries. 40 The court also held that there was no bona fide ann's length
bargaining over the rule on the basis that the rule remained unchanged
since it was unilaterally promulgated by management.41
However, other courts found that the non-statutory exemption could
apply to player restriction mechanisms in professional sports. In
McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.,42 the court found the exemption
applicable to protect the National Hockey League's version of a reserve
system.43 The court found that there was sufficient bona fide bargaining
so as to trigger the exemption, even though management did not yield at
45
all from its initial position. 4 Powell v. National Football League
46
In
continued the exemption even after the parties reached impasse.
34. See, e.g., Connell, 421 U.S. at 622-23; Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-91
(1965).
35. See CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 27, at 530; see also Jessica Cohen, Note,
Call You: Why Revenue SharingIs a Permissive Subject
Sharingthe Wealth: Don 'tCall Us. We 'll
and Therefore the Labor Exemption Does Not Apply, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 609, 626 (2002).
36. See CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 27, at 530.
37. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
38. See id. at 609.
39. Id. at 610-11; see CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 27, at 531-32.
Mackey, 543 F.2dat615.
Id. at 616; see also CHAMPION, NUTSHELL, supra note 25, at 68-69.
600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
See id. at 1203.
See id.
930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
46. See id. at 1304; see also C. Peter Goplerud 111, Collective Bargaining in the National
Football League: A Historical and Comparative Analysis, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 27-28
(1997) (providing that the court's holding in Powell "was necessary in order to give proper accord
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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Wood, the exemption protected their salary cap.47 Since "Wood
challenged agreements concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining, to
which labor law attaches a host of rights and obligations, [the court] saw
no place for the application of antitrust laws and found the non-statutory
exemption applicable. 48 In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,49 the United
States Supreme Court held that the NFL's unilateral imposition of a
fixed salary for developmental squad players was protected by the nonstatutory exemption. 50
III. JUDGE SCHEINDLIN DECLARES THE NFL "OUT OF BOUNDS"
Judge Scheindlin, in Clarett, indicated that to gain the non-statutory
labor exemption, the particular provision must be a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining;5 1 it must cover only those actions that "affect
employees within the bargaining unit or those who seek to become53
employees" 52 and it must evolve from arm's length negotiations.
Judge Scheindlin remembers, with advantages, Justice Stevens'
admonition in his dissent in Brown, that "exemptions should be
construed narrowly, and judicially crafted exemptions more narrowly
still."' 54 The draft eligibility rule is not the product of arm's length
negotiation nor is it a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
Judge Scheindlin elaborates that "[n]owhere is there a reference to
wages, hours, or conditions of employment. Indeed, the Rule makes a
class of potential players unemployable. 5 6 That is, the rule does not
involve a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, which is a
necessary prerequisite for the exemption's applicability. Mandatory
to federal labor policies"); Robert A. McCormick, Interference on Both Sides: The Case Against the
NFL-NFLPA Contract, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 397, 413-15 (1996) (discussing the Eighth
Circuit's holding in Powell that "as long as the NFL and the NFLPA maintained an 'ongoing
collective bargaining relationship,' disagreements regarding player mobility ...would be exempt
from antitrust review.").
47. See Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 956-57 (2d Cir. 1987).
369 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2004).
48. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (ClarettI11),
49. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
50. See id. at 234.
51. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 1), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 395 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
52. Id. at 393.
53. See id. at 396. "While Clarett offers no evidence on the issue of arm's-length bargaining,
he certainly highlights the NFL's absence of proof." Id. at 397.
54. Brown, 518 U.S. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. See Clarelt I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (explaining that the draft eligibility rule "does not
concern wages, hours, or conditions of employment and is therefore not covered by the nonstatutory labor exemption.").
56. Id. at 393.
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subjects affect only those who are employed or eligible for
employment. 7 Since Clarett was unable to return to college, "[t]he NFL
may be his only real option for playing football next year., 58 The rule
would make Clarett ineligible for employment. 9 So, he was ineligible
for employment even though there was "little doubt that Clarett [wa]s an
NFL-caliber player .... ,,60 According to the complaint, "[h]ad Clarett
been eligible for the 2003 Draft, it is almost certain he would have been
selected in the beginning of the First Round and would have agreed to a
contract and signing bonus worth millions of dollars. 61
Moreover, "[t]he exemption is also inapplicable because the Rule
only affects players, like Clarett, who are complete strangers to the
bargaining relationship. 6 2 Scheindlin cites to Mackey and reaffirms that
"labor laws cannot be used to shield anticompetitive agreements
between employers and unions that affect only those outside of the
bargaining unit."63 According to the facts of the case, "Clarett's
situation is very different. 64 Clarett was an individual who was
Also, Judge
"categorically denied eligibility for employment. 6 5
to demonstrate that the Rule
Scheindlin avers that "the NFL has failed
66
evolved from arm's-length negotiations.,
A. The Second Circuit in Clarett Reinvigorates the Non-Statutory Labor
Exemption
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Clarettheld that the NFL's
three years from high school eligibility rule was protected from antitrust
scrutiny on the basis of the applicability of the non-statutory labor
exemption. 67 Although the court admitted that there was no bargaining
between a union and management over the rule that alone did not
68
exclude the rule from the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption.
The Second Circuit had to cobble together an argument that would
57.
58.
59.
rule ....
60.
F. Supp.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See id. at 395.
Id. at 388.
See id. at 382 ("The only thing preventing him from [playing in the NFL] is the League's
").
Id. at 388; see also Complaint at para. 31, Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett1), 306
2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 03-CV-7441), 2003 WL 22469936 [hereinafter Complaint].
Complaint, supra note 60, at para. 31.
Clarett1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 111), 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
See id. at 142.
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69
somehow side-step the fact that there was no bargaining over the rule.
The Clarett appeals decision based its holding on the earlier Second
Circuit opinions of Wood, Caldwell, and Williams. However, all of
these opinions undeniably involved player restraint mechanisms that
were negotiated over and included as a part of the collective bargaining
agreement.7 0 The Clarett appeals court then combined these three
opinions with the United States Supreme Court opinion in Brown, which
applied the non-statutory labor exemption to management's unilaterally
setting the wages for developmental squad players. 71 The Clarett
appeals decision was based on the fact that these particular rules were
included in the NFL's Constitution and Bylaws,72 the union was aware

of these rules, 73 and that the union generally agreed to waive any

challenge to the Constitution and Bylaws.74
Clarett's argument was "that the NFL clubs invited antitrust
liability when they agreed amongst themselves to impose that same
criteria on every prospective player. 7 5 According to Clarett III,
"federal labor policy permits the NFL Teams to act collectively as a
multi-employer bargaining unit in structuring the rules of play and
setting the criteria for player employment. 7 6 The Clarett appeals court
averred that the fact that the rule excluded some potential employees
from consideration "does not render the NFL's adherence
to its
77
eligibility rules as a multi-employer bargaining unit suspect.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals summarized that Maurice
Clarett's suit was "simply a prospective employee's disagreement with
the criteria, established by the employer and the labor union, that he
must meet in order to be considered for employment. 7 8 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Clarett III, like the United States Supreme
Court in Brown, declined to "fashion an antitrust exemption [giving]
additional advantages to professional football players ...79 that transport
workers, coal miners, or meat packers would not enjoy.

69. See id. at 142-43.
70. See Clarett 111, 369 F.3d at 126.
71.

See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231,234 (1996); Clarett 111, 369 F.3d at 135.

72.

See Clarett 111, 369 F.3d at 142.

73.
74.

Id.
Id. (The union "acquiesced in the continuing operation of the eligibility rules contained

therein-at least for the duration of the agreement.").
75. Id.at 141.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.

78.
79.

Id. at 143.
Id. at 143 (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 249 (1996)).
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B. ClarettAppeals Court Posits Wood to Re-define the Exemption
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that "[t]he Supreme
80
Court has never delineated the precise boundaries of the exemption.,
The court in Clarett 1Il acknowledged that Maurice Claret maintained
that these boundaries were properly identified by the Eighth Circuit's
opinion in Mackey,8 1 and that the appeals court should follow Mackey.8 2
The Second Circuit declined to do so by reasoning that it has "never
regarded the Eighth Circuit's test in Mackey as defining the appropriate
limits of the non-statutory exemption., 83 The Clarett III appeals court
noted that other Second Circuit opinions similarly decided to avoid
Mackey. 84 In Local 210, Laborers' International Union v. Labor
8 5 the Second Circuit
Relations Division Associated General Contractors,
declined to follow Mackey in favor of the balancing test articulated in
86
Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.
Additionally, in United States Football League v. National Football
that Mackey was "not
League,87 the Second Circuit recognized
88
consistent with [the] decision in Wood.",
In Wood, the Second Circuit reviewed the legality of the National
Basketball Association's ("NBA") salary cap provisions. 89 A salary cap
90
"limits the total amount that each team can annually pay to its players."
The Wood court held that the salary cap was exempt from antitrust
analysis. 9' The court noted on appeal that "no one seriously contends
that the antitrust laws may be used to subvert fundamental principles of
our federal labor policy . .

80.

.

.Wood's claim is just such a wholesale

ClarettI1l,369 F.3d at 131.

81. See Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the
boundaries of the non-statutory labor exemption dictate that the restraint only affects parties to a
bona fide arm's-length collective bargaining arrangement concerning a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining).
82. Clarett 111, 369 F.3d at 133.
83. Id. Judge Lay in Mackey anticipated that the non-statutory exemption could be applicable
if the Rozelle Rule was "reached through good faith collective bargaining." See Mackey, 543 F.2d
at 623.
84. See Clarett 111, 369 F.3d at 133.
85. 844 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1988).
86.

See id. at 79., (discussing that the test from Jewel Tea "is one that balances the conflicting

policies embodied in the labor and antitrust laws, with the policies inherent in labor law serving as
the first point of reference.").
87.

842 F.2d 1335 (2d. Cir. 1988).

88.

Id.

89. See Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n (Wood 1),602 F. Supp. 525, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
affid, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).

90. CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 27, at 534.
91. See Wood1, 602 F. Supp. at 528.
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92
subversion of that policy, and it must be rejected out of hand.,
The Court of Appeals in Wood pointed out that "Wood further
[attacked] the draft and salary cap as disadvantaging new employees. 9 3
He also "argue[d] that the draft and salary cap are illegal because they
affect employees outside the bargaining unit., 94 "If Wood's antitrust
claim were to succeed ... federal labor policy would essentially collapse
unless a wholly unprincipled, judge-made exception were created for
professional athletes. 9 5 Wood's assertion that he would be paid more if
the restrictive provisions were absent "also implies that others would
receive less if he were successful. 9 6 The court noted that Wood
"offered [it] no reason whatsoever . . . on antitrustgrounds prohibiting
agreements ... that use seniority as a criterion for certain employment
decisions. 97
The Clarett appeals court used Wood to defeat Clarett's contention
that the eligibility rules are impermissible because they affect players
outside of the union, "[b]ut simply because the eligibility rules work a
hardship on prospective rather than current employees does not render
them impermissible. 98 Clarett argued that waiting another year was
unrelated to his ability to play. 99 However, "Clarett ... is no different
from the typical worker who is confident that he ... has the skills to fill
a job vacancy but does not possess the . . . requisite criteria that have
been set." 100

In the context of this collective bargaining relationship, the NFL and
its players union can agree that an employee will not be hired or
considered for employment for nearly any reason whatsoever so long
as they do not violate federal laws such as those prohibiting unfair
labor practices. Any challenge to those criteria must "be founded on

92. Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
93. Id. at 960. "However, newcomers in the industrial context routinely find themselves
disadvantaged vis-A-vis those already hired. A collective agreement may . . . provide salaries,
layoffs, and promotions be governed by seniority, even though some individuals with less seniority
would fare better if allowed to negotiate individually." Id. (citation omitted).
94. Id. "However, that is also a commonplace consequence of collective agreements." Id.
95. Id. at 961. "Employers would have no assurance that they could enter into any collective
agreement without exposing themselves to an action for treble damages." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 962.
98. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett I11), 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing
Wood, 809 F.2d at 960); see also Walter Champion, Clarett v. NFL and the Reincarnation of the
Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 587, 601-02 (2006).

99. ClarettlI,369F.3dat141.
100. Id.
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10
labor rather than antitrust law."

Clarett holds that the exemption "extends as far as necessary 0to2
ensure the successful operation of the collective bargaining process."'
Furthermore, this process safeguards the "unique bundle of
compromises" that is reached by management and the union as a means
of settling differences in professional football. 0 3

IV. CLARETT

APPEALS

COURT POSITS CALDWELL TO RE-DEFINE THE
EXEMPTION

In Caldwell, a former professional basketball player sought antitrust
relief based on his suspension as an alleged result of his activities as
president of the player's union. 104 The Second Circuit held that his
"antitrust claims [were] barred by the non-statutory labor exemption and
his state law claims [were] preempted by the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA") ....,105
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Clarett reiterated its earlier
position: "In Caldwell, our analysis began with the observation that
'[t]he inception of a collectively bargaining relationship between
employees and employers irrevocably alters the governing legal
regime. ' ,, 106 The ability of management to discharge an employee, or
refuse to hire a potential employee, involves a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. 10 7 "Thus, federal labor law afforded Caldwell a
host of administrative and judicial remedies to contest the parties'
agreements on the subject, as well as his firing and any team's refusal to
hire him."' 1 8 In the Clarett appeals decision, the court cited to Caldwell
again to indicate that just because "employers acted jointly in refusing
employment" does not transform issues remediable under labor law into
questions of antitrust; therefore, the non-statutory exemption is
applicable in both Caldwell and the Clarett appeals decisions.10 9

101.
omitted).
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. (quoting Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523, 530 (2d Cir. 1995)) (citation

Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143 (quoting Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 525.
Clarett II1, 369 F.3d at 137 (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1054

(D.C. Cir. 1995)).
107.
108.
109.

Id. (citing Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 529).
Id. (citing Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 529).
Id. (quoting Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 529).
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The Caldwell court reasoned that, "[t]o be sure, in sports leagues,
unionized players generally engage in individual bargaining with
teams."'11 But, it is "not an exercise of a right to free competition under
the antitrust laws; rather, it is an exercise of a right derived from
collective bargaining itself.""' The Caldwell court also noted that,
"[o]nce an exclusive representative has been selected, the individual
employee is forbidden ...from negotiating directly with the employer..
even though that employee may actually receive less compensation...
,,112 The "mandatory subject of bargaining pertinent in the instant
matter [Caldwell] is the circumstances under which an employer may
discharge or refuse to discharge an employee." ' 1 3 "We turn now to the
question of whether an employee's antitrust claim is somehow bolstered
that employers acted jointly in refusing employment. It
by an allegation
4
is not."''

1

The Caldwell court looked back again to other Second Circuit
sports exemption cases: "As we held in Williams, and as reaffirmed in
Brown, multi-employer bargaining groups do not violate the antitrust
laws although they plainly involve horizontal competitors for labor
acting in concert to set and to implement terms of employment." ' 1 5 In
Caldwell, once defendant, American Basketball Association ("ABA"),
was obligated to recognize the ABA Players Association ("ABAPA") as
the exclusive bargaining representative for all ABA players, "Caldwell
' 16
lost his right to seek the best bargain from individual ABA teams." "
Those teams then "became exempt from any antitrust rule that might
them to compete individually for players represented by
have compelled
17
the Union."''
110.

Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 528.

111.

Id.

112. Id. (quoting Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
at 529.
113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id. (citations omitted).
116. Id. at530
117. Id. "If the ABA and the Union had agreed in a collective agreement that Caldwell ...
could be discharged for any reason not specifically prohibited by ... federal law ... he could not

have challenged that agreement under the antitrust laws." Id. (emphasis added). See also Wood v.
Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 962, n.4. The Wood court noted:
At oral argument, counsel for Wood argued that because players are allowed a limited
right by the collective agreement to bargain individually, the antitrust laws somehow
compel that the right be unqualified. We perceive neither logic, policy, nor legal
authority supportingthis claim. No one denies that a union and employer ...may set a
fixed salary for an employee ....To hold that the NBPA and NBA must as a matter of
law opt either for fixed salaries or unlimited individual bargaining would further no
legitimate goal. One might well speculate that only a destructive impasse would result.
Id. (emphasis added).
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"Unlike the claim in Wood, Caldwell's claim regarding his
discharge is not directly inconsistent with substantive federal labor
law."' 18 But, to allow Caldwell to precede here would "subvert
fundamental principles of our federal labor policy . ,,
" 19 The Second
Circuit compares the core dispute in Caldwell to the familiar case of
determining whether a discharge was "for cause."' 120 Plaintiff claims that
he was refused employment because of his position "as Union president
and [the ABA's] resultant desire to exclude him from the NBA-ABA
merger negotiations. [Whereas], [t]he ABA claims that it [was] because
of his physical limitations." 21 If Caldwell [were] allowed to proceed,
similarly situated employees from now on might circumvent the NLRB
by instituting "parallel administrative and antitrust proceedings with the
risk of inconsistent adjudications."'' 22 The Second Circuit emphatically
concluded Caldwell with the reminder that "[t]here is no precedent
outside sportsfor ever initiatingthis genre of litigation."12' 3
A. ClarettAppeals Court Posits Williams to Re-define the Exemption
The Second Circuit noted in Williams that Wood concluded that "no
one seriously contends that the antitrust laws may be used to subvert
fundamental principles of our federal labor policy.'

24

However, "[t]he

present case [Williams] appears to have proven us wrong because just
such a contention is being seriously made.' 25 In Williams, the NBA
Teams sought a declaration that the continued imposition of disputed
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") would not
violate the antitrust laws because of the non-statutory labor exemption,
even after impasse.1 26 The players in Williams argued that "by acting

118.

Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 530.

119.

Id. (quoting Wood, 809 F.2d at 959).

120. Id. "This dispute is the familiar case of an employee asserting a discharge based on union
activities, a violation of NLRA § 8(a)(3), and an employer claiming that the discharge was for
cause." Id.
121. Id. "Caldwell, however, chose not to pursue his claim under the NLRA. Instead, he
sought relief under the Sherman Act." Id.
122. Id. "Every employee who is locked out by a multiemployer group, every striker who is
not reinstated, and every employee who is discharged could bring an antitrust action similar to
Caldwell's. Clearly, congress had no such intention." Id.
123. Id. (emphasis added). "[W]e adhere to what we said in Wood, namely that 'a wholly
unprincipled, judge-made exception.., for professional athletes' should not be created." Id. at 531
(quoting Wood, 809 F.2d at 961).
124. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 690 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Wood, 809
F.2d at 959).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 686 (explaining that the disputed provisions were the College Draft, the Right of
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collectively to impose terms of employment after expiration of the CBA,
as a cartel and committing a per se
the NBA Teams are . . . acting
127

violation of the Sherman Act.,

"In the sports industry, multiemployer bargaining exists ... because

some terms and conditions of employment must be the same for all
teams in a sports league." 128 The players then almost illogically argue
"that the most routine practices of multiemployer bargaining ... are per
se unlawful." 129 This "stark claim" has not been asserted in the 104

years of existence of the Sherman Act. 130 "The lack of any antitrust
challenge to, or congressional action restricting multiemployer
bargaining, for a century during which it prominently existed, grew, and
flourished, strongly suggests some kind of general understanding about
the legality of multiemployer bargaining that is fundamentally
inconsistent with appellants' claim." 13 1 Therefore, "[t]o hold at this late
cause a massive
date that it ...is illegal under the antitrust laws would
13 2

reshaping of the institution of collective bargaining."

"Turning to the precise facts" of Williams, "under the Teams'

obligation to bargain in good faith, they were obligated to maintain the
status quo until an impasse was reached.,

133

The Williams basketball

players, however, argued that the "imposition of those provisions
violated the antitrust laws as soon as the CBA expired, a position that
views as illegal, conduct required by the NLRA.' 34 However, the
Williams court concluded that "[e]ven after impasse ... employers...
are surely free to maintain the status quo."1' 35 In Brown, petitioners

First Refusal, and the Revenue Sharing/Salary Cap System). In both Powell v. Nat'l Football
League, 888 F.2d 559, 568 (8th Cit. 1989), amended by 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), and Brown
v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 246 (1996), the non-statutory labor exemption was deemed to
extend beyond impasse for two particular player restraint mechanisms in professional football.
127. Williams, 45 F.3d at 687.
128. Id. at 689.
Unlike the industrial context in which many work rules can differ from employer to
employer-even though a roughly common bottom line is desirable-sports leagues
need many common rules. Number of games, length of season, playoff structures, and
roster size and composition, for example, are just a few of the many kinds of league rules
that are typically bargained over by sports leagues and unions of players.
Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. "It is true that recent antitrust challenges in the professional sports industry have at
times involved facts very similar to those in the instant matter, but the multiemployer bargaining
issue appears to have been raised obliquely, if at all." Id. (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 690.
132. Id. at 691.
133. Id.; see also NLRB v. Katz, 396 U.S. 736 (1962).
134. Williams, 45 F.3d at 691 (emphasis added).
135. Id.
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argued "that irrespective of how the labor exemption applies elsewhere
to multiemployer collective bargaining, professional sports is
'special."", 136 The Supreme Court in Brown "can understand how
professional sports may be special in terms of, say, interest, excitement,
or concern. But [it] do not understand
how they are special in respect to
137
labor law's antitrust exemption."'
The Williams court agreed with the Eight Circuit in Powell that the
exemption precludes antitrust challenges to various terms and conditions
implemented by the NFL after impasse. 138 "The [Powell] Court . . .
concluded that application of antitrust principles to a collective
bargaining relationship would disrupt collective bargaining as we know
it.' 139 "We agree. The claim before us [in Williams], if adopted, would
prevent employers in all industries from jointly bargaining hard with a
common union. 14 °
We therefore hold that the antitrust laws do not prohibit employers
from bargaining jointly with a union, from implementing their joint
proposals in the absence of a CBA, or from using economic force to
What limits on such conduct that
obtain agreement to those proposals.
141
exist arefound in the labor laws.

The Clarett appeals court, echoing Williams, noted "that the
players' antitrust claims were inconsistent with federal labor law
because they imperiled the legitimacy of multi-employer bargaining...
,9142

B. The Second Circuit's "Second Look" at the Exemption
The Second Circuit in Clarett began its analysis 143 with the
following assumption: "The Supreme Court has never delineated the

136. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248 (1996).
137. Id.
138. Williams, 45 F.3d at 692-93 (agreeing with Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 930 F.2d
1293 (8th Cir. 1989)).
139. Id. at 693.
140. Id.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 111), 369 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2004).
143. td. at 130. "The non-statutory exemption has been inferred 'from federal labor statues,
which set forth a national labor policy favoring free and private collective bargaining; which require
good-faith bargaining over wages, hours, and working conditions; and which delegate related
rulemaking and interpretive authority to the National Labor Relations Board."' Id. (quoting Brown
v. Pro Football, Inc. 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996)).
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In that vacuum, the

Second Circuit boldly formulated an alternative theory 145 in contrast to
the Eighth Circuit's semi-classic interpretation of the exemption in
Mackey, 146 which did not allow the exemption to be foisted on the union
on the grounds that their weak position precluded effective collective
bargaining. 47 Judge Lay developed a three-part test: He would allow
immunity when the restraint affects only the parties to the agreement,
when it is a mandatory subject, and148when the agreement is a product of
bona fide arm's length negotiation.
In conclusion, although we find that non-labor parties may potentially
avail themselves of the non-statutory labor exemption where they are
parties to collective bargaining agreements pertaining to mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining, the exemption cannot be invoked
where, as here, the agreement was not the product of bona fide arm'slength negotiations.149

Mackey concludes that the exemption is inapplicable if "the
agreement was not the product of bona fide arm' s-length
negotiations."' 5 °
One can certainly effectively argue, as Judge Scheindlin did in
Clarett I, that there was no bargaining at all over the NFL's three-year
out-of-high school rule, 15 let alone the bona fide arm's-length
negotiation that Judge Lay called for in Mackey. 152 Judge Sotomayor in
Clarett III avoided the absolute necessity of the requirement of
legitimate negotiation by re-defining the parameters of the discussion. 153
Under Sotomayor's view, it is not an antitrust problem, but instead labor
law is controlling. 54 Sotomayor indicated that "we [the Second Circuit]
found [in Williams] that the players' antitrust claims were inconsistent
with federal labor law because they imperiled the legitimacy of multiemployer bargaining, 'a process by which employers band together to

144.

Id. at 131.

145.
146.
147.

Id. at 130.
Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976).
Id.; see also CHAMPION, NUTSHELL, supra note 25, at 68-69.

148.
149.
150.
151.

Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623.
Id.
Id.
Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 1), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396. "[T]he NFL has

failed to demonstrate that the Rule evolved from arm's-length negotiations." Id.
152.
153.
154.

Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623.
See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 11), 369 F.3d 124, 137 (2d Cir. 2004).
See id.
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act as a single entity in bargaining with a common union."' 155 In short,
the Second Circuit in ClarettIII held that the fact that the league and the
union failed to bargain over
the rule did not exclude the rule from the
56
exemption.'
the
of
scope
Sotomayor's analysis of the problem in Clarett was different than
Judge Lay's interpretation in Mackey.
Thus, we need not decide here whether the Mackey factors aptly
characterize the limits of the exemption in cases in which employers
use agreements with their unions to disadvantage their competitors in
the product or business market, because our cases have counseled a
decidedly different approach where, as here, the plaintiff complains of
a restraint upon a unionized labor market characterized by a collective
bargaining relationship with a multi-employer bargaining unit.157
' 8 are
"Our cases" that counsel "a decidedly different approach"15
Caldwell, Williams, and Wood. Moreover, Clarett III again distances
itself from Mackey by indicating that the Mackey guideposts do "not
comport with the Supreme Court's most recent treatment of the nonstatutory labor exemption in Brown."' 159 "In each case [Caldwell,
Williams, and Wood], [the court] held that the non-statutory labor
exemption defeated the players' claims." ' 60 "[The court's] analysis in
each case was rooted in the observation that the relationships among the
defendant sports leagues and their players were governed by collective
bargaining agreements and thus were subject to the carefully structured
regime established by federal labor laws."'16 1 Thus, the court "need only
retrace the path laid down by these prior cases to reach the conclusion
that Clarett's antitrust claims must fail. 162
In Clarett III, the court observed that "we held that to permit Wood
to challenge particular aspects of their agreement on antitrust grounds
163

would 'subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor policy.'

Wood's claim that the CBA prevented him from negotiating directly
with individual teams "contravened the principle . . .that once . . .

155.

Id.at 136 (quoting Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 688 (2d Cir. 1995)).

156. Id.
157. Id. at 134 (citing Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995);
Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995); Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n,
809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987)).
158. Id.
159. Id.

160. Id.at 135.
161. Id.
162.

Id.

163.

Id. (citing Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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employees . . . unionize and elects . . . representative[s], individual

employees-whether in the bargaining unit or not-no longer possess
' 64
the right to negotiate with the employer for the best deal possible." 1
Clarett III incorporates that notion from Wood-that it is immaterial
whether the "employee" in question is actually in the unit-and
synthesizes it as a major component of the Second Circuit's "new" look
at the exemption.' 65 0. Leon Wood was about to become a part of the
bargaining unit, whereas Maurice Clarett wanted to join the unit, but
could not because of the NFL's eligibility rule.' 66 If there is a
distinction, ClarettIII pays little attention to it.
We further rejected Wood's contention that the non-statutory
exemption did not preclude his challenge because he was not a
member of the union when the collective bargaining agreement
became effective, observing that new union members often find
themselves disadvantaged vis-a-vis more senior union members and
disadvantage employees
that collective bargaining units commonly
67
outside of, or about to enter, the union.
Judge Scheindlin, on the other hand, noted that "[t]he only thing
preventing him [Clarett] from achieving that goal [playing in the NFL]
is the League's rule limiting eligibility to players three seasons removed
from their high school graduation.' 6 8
Clarett III used Williams in its equation to negate Clarett's
contention that since the NFL's eligibility rule was "buried" in the
NFL's Constitution and By-laws, it was never negotiated in any
meaningful sense.' 69 Williams took a bolder stance, in that the
challenged player restraints were unilaterally promulgated after impasse;
that is, these restraints "were not encompassed in any effective
agreement
' 70
expired."'

.

.

because the collective bargaining agreement had

Moreover, in the context of sports leagues, we observed that multiemployer bargaining units serve the additional, important purpose of
allowing the teams to establish and demand uniformity in the rules

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
(2d Cir.
170.

Id. at 135 (citing Wood, 809 F.2d at 959-60).
Id. at 135-36 (citing Wood, 809 F.2d at 960).
Wood, 809 F.2d at 960.
Clarett 11, 369 F.2d at 135-36 (citing Wood, 809 F.2d at 960).
Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 1), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Clarett 111, 369 F.3d at 136 (citing Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 693
1995)).
Id. (citing Williams, 45 F.3d at 686).
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necessary for the proper functioning of the sport. Second, we found
that legality of conduct undertaken in the course of negotiations over a
collective bargaining agreement is an issue committed to the
specialized knowledge of the National Labor Relations Board, for
which federal labor law provides a "soup-to-nuts array of rules and
remedies." 171

The Clarett appeals court continued to manipulate Williams and
by the antitrust laws
postulated that to double-police the same conduct
' 172
scheme."
"remedial
NLRB's
the
would disrupt
The final piece in Judge Sotomayor's puzzle was the Second
Circuit case of Caldwell, decided on September 21, 1995.173 "Jumping
Joe" Caldwell "alleged that the teams consequently agreed among
themselves, in violation of the antitrust laws, that he should be fired and
then blacklisted from professional play."' 174 Although the district court
did not see the necessity of referring "whatsoever" to the CBA since the
exemption was inapplicable "because the dispute did not implicate a
then-existing collective bargaining agreement"; 175 however, the Second
Circuit in affirming the district court's decision76 held "that the nonstatutory exemption defeated Caldwell' s claims."
Clarett 111 incorporated Caldwell's reasoning that Caldwell's
claims "insofar as they concerned the 'circumstances under which an
employer may discharge or refuse to hire an employee,' involved a
mandatory bargaining subject.', 177 "Drawing upon our discussion.., in
Williams, we then observed that the legality . . . of his [Caldwell's]

treatment did not become a question of antitrust law simply because the

171. Id. (quoting Williams, 45 F.3d at 693) (citation omitted).
172. Id.
173. Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523, 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
174. Clarett 11I,369 F.3d at 136 (citing Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 526).
175. Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 528, n.1.
The district court in the instant case held that the nonstatutory labor exemption did not
apply to appellees because the dispute did not implicate a then-existing collective
bargaining agreement. Noting that Caldwell's suspension "was not predicated on the
suspension provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement [first entered in 1972] or
the Association By-laws," the district court stated that "this controversy may be entirely
resolved without any reference whatsoever to the Collective Bargaining Agreement."
National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, has since applied the nonstatutory exemption in
circumstances in which no collective bargaining existed, as did Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc., which held that the nonstatutory exemption applies whenever there is a collective
bargaining relationship regardless of whether a collective bargaining agreement is in
force.
Id. at 528-29, n.1.
176. Clarett111, 369 F.3d at 137 (citing Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 527).
177. Id. (quoting Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 529).
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'employers acted jointly in refusing employment."",17 8 Clarett III
continued that "[b]ecause such [employment] issues are remediable
under labor law [in Caldwell], we concluded that the non-statutory
exemption applied,"'' 7 9 and that conclusion fairly states the basic
presumption in the Second Circuit's logic in all four cases (Clarett III,
Wood, Williams, and Caldwell) that "employment decisions" must only
be remediated by the labor laws. 80 Therefore, the non-statutory labor
exemption is prima facie applicable in all comparable cases. In its
reasoning, the only way to hold otherwise would be to create an
unprecedented sports exception: "We, however, follow the Supreme
Court's lead in declining to 'fashion an antitrust exemption [so as to
give] additional advantages to professional football players ....
,,,8
V. CONCLUSION

"[T]he Supreme Court's treatment of the non-statutory exemption
in [Brown] gives [no] reason to doubt the authority of our prior decisions
in Caldwell, Williams, and Wood."' 82 The Clarett appeals decision
concluded "that our prior decisions in this area fully comport-in
approach and result-with the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, we
regard them as controlling authority.' ' 183 ClarettIII posited that the rules
governing draft eligibility in the case of Maurice Clarett were similarly
exempted on the basis of the three earlier Second Circuit cases
[Caldwell, Williams, and Wood], as well as the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown, that dealt with professional sports rules involving
84
practices that directly affect wages, hours, or working conditions.
The beauty of the Second Circuit's school of thought on the nonstatutory exemption is that it effectively manipulates the three earlier
decisions in Caldwell, Williams, and Wood to strengthen the weakness
of Clarett III, which is that the NFL's eligibility rule arguably does not
affect mandatory subjects of collective bargaining (e.g., wages, hours,
and working conditions). 85 Caldwell described a mandatory subject as
"the circumstances under which an employer may ... refuse to hire an

178. Id. (quoting Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 529).
179. Id.
180.

Id.

181. Id. at 143 (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 249 (1996)).
182. Id. at 138.

183. Id.
184.

See generally id. at 134-38.

185. Id.at 138.
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employee."

186

But remember Judge Scheindlin's major sticking point:

"Nowhere is there a reference to wages, hours, or conditions of
employment. Indeed, the Rule makes a class of potential players
unemployable."' 87 Sotomayor trumps Scheindlin with the proffered

maxim that "[tihough tailored to the unique circumstance of a
professional sports league, the eligibility rules for the draft represent a
and for that alone might
quite literal condition for initial employment
' 88
subject."
bargaining
mandatory
a
constitute
The overriding thrust of the "Second Circuit School" is the

preeminence of labor laws over antitrust law in deciding the legality of
player restraint mechanisms in professional sports. Clarett III poses the
question in this manner: "The issue we must decide is whether
subjecting the NFL's eligibility rules to antitrust scrutiny would 'subvert
fundamental principles of our federal labor policy. ,1 89 The court

answers "that it would and that the non-statutory exemption therefore
applies."' 90 Mackey's three-prong test' 9 ' is, therefore, effectively sidestepped or at least seriously marginalized.1 92

186. Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523, 529 (2d Cit. 1995).
187. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett1), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
188. Clarett I, 369 F.3d at 139.
189. Id. at 138 (quoting Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
190. Id.
191. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
192. Clarettlfl,369 F.3d at 133.
Specifically, the district court found that the rules exclude strangers to the bargaining
relationship from entering the draft, do not concern wages, hours, or working conditions
of current NFL players, and were not the product of bona fide arm's-length negotiations
during the process that culminated in the current collective bargaining agreement.
Id. (citing Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395-97). Notwithstanding the finding of the district court,
the court then elaborated on its own disapproval of the Mackey test. Id. at 133-34.
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